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rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate
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consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with suboptimal regimes.
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Much recent work in macroeconomics has involved the development and evaluation
of monetary models that bring imperfect competition and nominal rigidities into the
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium structure that for a long time had been the
hallmark of RBC theory. In the resulting models ￿often referred to as New Keynesian￿
changes in monetary settings generally have nontrivial eﬀects on real variables. Mon-
etary policy may thus become a potential stabilization tool, as well as an independent
source of economic ￿uctuations. Not surprisingly, the study of the properties of al-
ternative monetary policy rules (i.e., speci￿cations of how the central bank changes
the settings of its instrument in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions)
has been a fruitful area of research in recent years and a natural application of the
new generation of models.1
I nt h ep r e s e n tp a p e rw el a yo u tasmall open economy version of a model with
Calvo-type staggered price-setting, and use it as a framework to analyze the properties
and macroeconomic implications of alternative monetary policy regimes.2 The use
of a staggered price-setting structure allows for richer dynamic eﬀects of monetary
policy than those found in the models with one-period advanced price-setting that
are common in the recent literature.3 Most importantly, and in contrast with most of
the existing literature ￿where monetary policy is introduced by assuming that some
monetary aggregate follows an exogenous stochastic process￿ we model monetary
policy as endogenous, with a short-term interest rate being the instrument of that
policy.4 For this very reason our framework allows us to model alternative monetary
regimes. Furthermore, we believe that our approach accords much better with the
practice of modern central banks, and provides a more suitable framework for policy
analysis than the traditional one.
Our assumptions on preferences and technology, combined with the Calvo price-
1The volume edited by Taylor (1999) contains several signi￿cant contributions to that literature.
See, e.g., Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) for a recent survey.
2See, e.g., King and Wolman (1996), Yun (1996), and Woodford (1999), for an analysis of the
canonical closed economy Calvo model.
3See, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1999), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Betts and Devereux
(2000), and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (1999)
4See Lane (2001) for a survey of the new open economy macroeconomics literature. The intro-
d u c t i o no fp r i c es t a g g e r i n gi na no p e ne c o n o m ym o d e lf o l l o w st h el e a do fK o l l m a n( 2 0 0 1 )a n dC h a r i
et al. (1998), though both papers specify monetary policy as exogenous, restricting their analysis
to the eﬀects of a monetary shock. A recent exception is given by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1999), who
solve for the optimal money supply rule in the context of a model with one-period sticky wages. A
more similar methodological approach can be found in Svensson (2000), in which optimal policy is
derived from the minimization by the central bank of a quadratic loss function. His model, however,
diﬀers from the standard optimizing sticky price model analyzed here in that it assumes a predeter-
mined output and in￿ation (resulting from their dependence on lagged variables, with a somewhat
arbitrary lag structure), and introduces an ad-hoc cost-push shock in the in￿ation equation (which
creates a trade oﬀ between the output gap and in￿ation). Since we wrote and circulated the ￿rst
version of the present paper there have been several contributions to the literature on monetary
policy regimes in open economies, including Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2000), Benigno and Benigno
(2000), McCallum and Nelson (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Parrado and Velasco (2002), and
Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2001), among others.
1setting structure and the assumption of complete ￿nancial markets, give rise to a
highly tractable framework and to simple and intuitive log-linearized equilibrium
conditions for the small open economy. In fact, the latter can be reduced to a ￿rst or-
der, two-equation dynamical system for domestic in￿ation and the output gap whose
structure, consisting of a new Keynesian Phillips curve and a new IS-type equation,
is identical to the one that has been derived (and is often used) for the workhorse
model of a closed economy with Calvo-type staggered price setting.5 Of course, the
coeﬃcients in the open economy￿s equilibrium also depend on parameters that are
speci￿c to the open economy (in our case, the degree of openness and the substi-
tutability between domestic and foreign goods), while the driving forces also include
world output ￿uctuations (which are taken as exogenous to the small open economy).
As in the closed economy benchmark, the two equations must be augmented with a
third one describing how monetary policy is conducted, in order to close the model.
As hinted above we employ our framework to analyze the macroeconomic impli-
cations of alternative monetary policy arrangements for the small open economy: (a)
domestic in￿ation targeting, (b) CPI in￿ation targeting and (c) an exchange rate peg.
We show that these regimes can be ranked in terms of their implied nominal
and real exchange rate volatility. Hence, a policy of domestic in￿ation targeting,
which in our framework can achieve a simultaneous stabilization of the output gap
and domestic in￿ation, implies a substantially larger volatility of both nominal and
real exchange rates than CPI targeting and/or an exchange rate peg. In general, a
CPI targeting regime delivers equilibrium dynamics that allow to characterize it as
a hybrid regime between domestic in￿ation targeting and an exchange rate peg. In
particular, CPI targeting coincides with domestic in￿ation targeting when the small
economy approaches the limiting case of a closed economy, while it tends to mimic
the dynamics under a peg when the small economy converges to the highest possible
degree of openness.
Next we address the issue of a welfare evaluation of the above policy regimes. We
show that under a speci￿c parameterization it is possible to derive a tractable second
order approximation of the consumer￿s utility, which can be used for policy evalua-
tion purposes. In the particular case considered (which entails log-utility and a unit
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods), domestic price stabil-
ity stands out as the policy regime that is able to replicate the eﬃcient allocation,
while both CPI targeting and the exchange rate peg are shown to lead to deviations
from the economy￿s optimal response to shocks. The basic intuition is that the excess
smoothness in the nominal exchange rate implied by both these regimes, combined
with the assumed inertia in nominal prices, prevents relative prices from adjusting
suﬃciently fast in response to changes in relative productivity, causing thus a sig-
ni￿cant deviation from the ￿rst best allocation. Interestingly, while CPI targeting
has qualitative implications similar to those of an exchange rate peg, the former is
shown to dominate the latter from a welfare viewpoint (except for the limiting case
of identical consumption baskets).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out
the basic model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium in log-linearized form and its
5See, e.g., Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2000), among others.
2canonical representation in terms of output gap and in￿ation. Section 4 analyzes the
macroeconomic implications of alternative monetary policy regimes, such as domestic
in￿ation targeting, CPI in￿ation targeting and an exchange rate peg. Section 5
analyzes optimal monetary policy in both the world and the small economy under
a particular parameterization in the latter, and conducts a welfare evaluation of the
alternative monetary regimes. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Small Open Economy Model
2.1 Households






t [U(Ct) − V (Nt)] (1)
















with CH,t and CF,t being indices of consumption of domestic and foreign goods. Such
indices are in turn given by the following CES aggregators of the quantities consumed

















Notice that under our speci￿cation η measures the elasticity of substitution be-
tween domestic and foreign goods. The elasticity of substitution among goods within
each category is given by ε.W ea s s u m eη > 0 and ε > 1.
The maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget con-
straints of the form:
Z 1
0
[PH,t(i)CH,t(i)+PF,t(i)CF,t(i)] di + Et{Qt,t+1 Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + Tt (3)
for t =0 ,1,2,...,w h e r ePH,t(i) and PF,t(i) denote the prices of domestic and foreign
good i respectively , Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ in period t+1of the portfolio held at
the end of period t (and which includes shares in ￿rms), Wt is the nominal wage, and
Tt denotes lump-sum transfers/taxes. All the previous variables are expressed in units
of domestic currency. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs. We
assume that households have access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded
internationally. Notice that money does not appear in either the budget constraint
or the utility function: throughout we specify monetary policy in terms of an interest
3rate rule; hence, we do not need to introduce money explicitly in the model.6
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category of goods





















the price indexes for domestic and imported goods.
The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and foreign goods im-
plies:











where Pt ≡ [(1 − α) PH,t
1−η + α PF,t
1−η]
1
1−η is the consumer price index (CPI).7 No-
tice that, when the price indexes for domestic and foreign goods are equal (as in
the steady state described below), parameter α corresponds to the share of domes-
tic consumption allocated to imported goods. It thus represents a natural index of
openness.
Once we account for the above optimality conditions, the intertemporal budget
constraint can be rewritten as:
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1 Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + Tt (6)
In what follows we specialize the period utility function to take the form U(Ct) ≡
C1−σ
t




1+ϕ . Then we can rewrite the remaining optimality conditions



















Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (8) and rearranging terms we










6That modelling strategy has been adopted in much recent research on monetary policy. In it
money can be thought of as playing the role of a unit of account only. See Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2001) for an analysis of an open economy where the monetary distortion is taken to be
non-negligible.
7It is usefult to notice, for future reference, that in the particular case of η =1 ,t h eC P It a k e s
the form Pt = P1−α
H,t Pα






t = Et {Qt,t+1}is the price of a riskless one-period bond (denominated in
domestic currency) and, hence, Rt is its gross return.
For future reference it is useful to note that (7) and (9) can be respectively written
in log-linearized form as:
wt − pt = σ ct + ϕ nt
ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ)
where lower case letters denote the logs of the respective variables, ρ ≡−logβ is the
time discount rate, and πt ≡ pt − pt−1 is CPI in￿ation (with pt ≡ logPt).
In the rest of the world (which, for convenience, we refer to as the world economy)
a representative household faces a problem identical to the one outlined above. A
set of analogous optimality conditions characterize the solution to the consumer￿s
problem in the world economy. We assume, however, that the size of the small open
economy is negligible relative to the rest of the world, which allows us to treat the
latter as if it was a closed economy.8
2.1.1 Domestic In￿ation, CPI In￿ation, the Real Exchange Rate, and the
Terms of Trade: Some Identities
Before proceeding with our analysis of the economy￿s equilibrium we introduce several
assumptions and de￿nitions, and derive a number of identities that are extensively
used below.
Thus, log-linearization of the CPI formula around a steady state with PH,t = PF,t
yields:
pt ≡ (1 − α) pH,t + α pF,t
= pH,t + α st (10)
where st ≡ pF,t −pH,t denotes the (log) terms of trade, i.e., the price of foreign goods
in terms of home goods. It is useful to note, for future reference, that (10) holds
exactly (as opposed to up to a ￿rst order approximation) when η =1 .
It follows that domestic in￿ation ￿de￿ned as the rate of change in the index
of domestic goods prices, i.e., πH,t ≡ pH,t+1 − pH,t ￿a n dCPI-in￿ation are linked
according to
πt = πH,t + α ∆st (11)
which makes the gap between our two measures of in￿ation proportional to the percent
change in the terms of trade, with the coeﬃcient of proportionality given by the index
of openness α. Our treatment of the rest of the world as an (approximately) closed
8Formally, this can be done by deriving the optimality conditions for the world consumer under
preferences analogous to (2) with a weight α∗ on goods produced in the small economy. Once the
equilibrium conditions are derived and log-linearized, we focus on the limiting case, α∗ → 0.
5economy (with goods produced in the small open economy (SOE) representing a
negligible fraction of the world￿s consumption basket) implies that the foreign price
index P∗
t (where a star denotes foreign variables henceforth) coincides with P∗
F,t (i.e.,
the foreign currency price of foreign goods). Therefore we have π∗
t = π∗
F,t, for all t,
i.e., an equivalence between domestic and CPI in￿ation holds in the world economy.
In addition, we assume throughout that the law of one price holds, implying that
PF,t(i)=Et P ∗
F,t(i) for all i ∈ [0,1],w h e r eEt is the nominal exchange rate (the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency), and P ∗
F,t(i) is the price of foreign good i
denominated in foreign currency. Integrating over all goods we obtain PF,t = Et P∗
F,t,
or, in log-linear form, pF,t = et +p∗
F,t. Combining the previous results we can re-write
the terms of trade as
st ≡ et + p
∗
t − pH,t (12)
Next, let us derive the relationship between the terms of trade and the real ex-
change rate. We de￿ne the (log) real exchange rate as Qt ≡
Et P∗
t
Pt ,i . e .t h er a t i oo f
CPIs expressed in a common currency. Under our assumptions it follows that
qt = st + pH,t − pt (13)
=( 1 − α) st
where the second equality holds up to a ￿rst order approximation.
In words, we have that the (log) real exchange rate is proportional to the (log)
terms of trade, with the proportionality coeﬃcient being an inverse function of the
degree of openness. Notice that while the law-of-one-price is assumed to hold for each
individual good, the real exchange rate may still ￿uctuate over time as a result of
variations in the relative price of domestic vs. world consumption baskets, which will
generally diﬀer in composition.
2.1.2 International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete securities markets, a ￿rst order condition analogous

















Combining (8) and (14), together with the de￿nition of the real exchange rate intro-
duced above, it follows (after iterating) that:






for all t,w h e r eϑ is a constant that depends on initial conditions.9 Taking logs on both









9See Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion.
6We thus see that the assumption of complete markets at the international level leads
to a simple relationship linking consumption at home and abroad and the terms of
trade.10
2.1.3 Uncovered Interest Parity and the Terms of Trade
Under the assumption of complete international ￿nancial markets, the equilibrium
price (in terms of domestic currency) of a riskless bond denominated in foreign cur-
rency is given by Et R∗
t
−1 = Et{Qt,t+1 Et+1}. The previous pricing equation can be
combined with the domestic bond pricing equation, R
−1
t = Et{Qt,t+1} to obtain a
v e r s i o no ft h euncovered interest parity condition:
Et{Qt,t+1 [Rt − R
∗
t (Et+1/Et)]} =0
Linearization around a perfect-foresight steady state yields the familiar expression:
rt − r
∗
t = Et{∆et+1} (17)






t+1}) − (rt − Et{πH,t+1})+Et{st+1} (18)
As we show in Appendix 1, the terms of trade are pinned down uniquely in the
perfect foresight steady state. That fact, combined with our assumption of station-
arity of the model￿s driving forces, implies that limT→∞ Et{sT} =0 , implying that









t+k+1) − (rt+k − πH,t+k+1)]} (19)
i.e., variations in the terms of trade are a function of current and anticipated real
interest rate diﬀerentials.
We must point out that while equation (18) (and (19)) provides a convenient (and
intuitive) way of representing the terms of trade dynamics, it is not an additional
independent equilibrium condition. In particular, it is easy to check that (18) can
be derived by combining the consumption Euler equations for both the domestic and
world economies with the risk sharing condition (16) and equation (11).
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Technology
Each ￿rm produces a diﬀerentiated good with a linear technology represented by the
production function
Yt(i)=At Nt(i)
10A similar relationship holds in many international RBC models. See, e.g., Backus and Smith
(1993).
7where at ≡ logAt follows an AR(1) process at = ρa at−1 + εt. Hence, the (nominal)
marginal cost will be common across ￿rms and given by
mc
n
t = −ν + wt − at
where ν ≡−log(1−τ) ,w i t hτ being an employment subsidy whose role is discussed







represent an index for aggregate output, analogous
to the one introduced for consumption. It is useful, for future reference, to derive an
approximate aggregate production function relating the previous index to aggregate











Yt di. In Appendix 3 we show that equilibrium variations in ut ≡
logUt around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus, and up to
a ￿rst order approximation, we have an aggregate relationship
yt = nt + at (20)
Firms in the rest of the world are assumed to have access to an identical technology,




t,w h e r e
{ε∗
t} is white noise, possibly correlated with {εt}. Finally, an approximate aggregate
relationship between output and employment identical to (20) also holds for the world
economy.
2.2.2 Price setting
We assume that ￿rms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). Hence,
am e a s u r e1 − θ of (randomly selected) ￿rms sets new prices each period, with an
individual ￿rm￿s probability of reoptimizing in any given period being independent
of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. As we show in Appendix 2, the
optimal price-setting strategy for the typical ￿rm resetting its price in period t can
be approximated by the (log-linear) rule:












,w h i c h
corresponds to the log of the (gross) markup in the steady state (or, equivalently, the
optimal markup in a ￿exible price economy). An analogous price setting rule obtains
for ￿rms operating in the rest of the world.
Hence, we see that the pricing decision in our model (as in its closed economy
counterpart) is a forward-looking one. The reason is simple: ￿rms that are adjusting
prices in any given period recognize that the price they set will remain eﬀective for
a (random) number of periods. As a result they set the price as a markup over
8a weighted average of expected future marginal costs, instead of looking at current
marginal cost only. Notice that in the ￿exible price limit (i.e., as θ → 0), we recover
the familiar markup rule pH,t = ￿ + mcn
t .
The price setting problem facing ￿rms in the rest of the world is also identical to
that of domestic ￿rms, and leads to an optimal price setting rule analogous to (21).
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume throughout our analysis that
the degree of price stickiness in the world economy, θ
∗, is identical to that in the small
open economy.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Aggregate Demand and Output Determination
3.1.1 World Consumption and Output
First we describe how consumption and output are determined in the world economy.
As mentioned above, in that economy the preferences of the representative household
are identical to those introduced above, but with a negligible weight on the goods
imported from the small economy. The log-linearized Euler equation, combined with














t+1} − ρ) (22)
Hence, as in the standard New Keynesian closed economy model, world output is
inversely related to current and anticipated world real interest rates. The previous
equation, often referred to as the new IS equation, is one of the key building blocks
of optimizing sticky price models. Next we derive a version of such an equation for
the small open economy.
3.1.2 Consumption and Output in the Small Open Economy
Let C∗
H,t(i)denote the world demand for the domestic good i. Then market clearing















































for all i ∈ [0,1] and all t, where the second equality follows from (4),and (5) (together
with an analogous expression for the rest of the world), and the third equality makes
use of (15) and the condition α∗
ϑ = α required for a zero trade balance in the steady
state (see appendix 1).



























where ωα ≡ 1+α (2 − α)(ση − 1) > 0, and where the subscript α is meant to
emphasize the dependence of ωα on the degree of openness of the economy. Notice
that in the particular case of ση =1we obtain the exact log-linear relationship:
yt = y
∗
t + η st (26)
Alternatively, if we use (16) to substitute out for st in (25) we can derive a simple
expression for domestic consumption as a weighted average of domestic and world
output, which will hold as a ￿rst order approximation:
ct = Φα yt +( 1− Φα) y
∗
t (27)
where Φα ≡ 1−α
ωα > 0. Notice that in the particular case of α =0 , corresponding to a
closed economy, we have ω0 =1, Φ0 =1 , and hence ct = yt for all t.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i n
the particular case of ση =1 , we can combine the exact relationships (16) and (26)
to obtain:
ct =( 1− α) yt + α y
∗
t (28)
Finally we can combine (27), (11), and (25), with the consumer￿s log-linear Euler
equation to derive a diﬀerence equation for domestic output in terms of domestic real
interest rates and world output:
yt = Et{yt+1} −
ωα
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ)+( ωα − 1) Et{∆y
∗
t+1} (29)
By solving (29) forward, it is easy to see the level of output in the small economy
is negatively related to current and anticipated domestic real interest rates. It is also
related to anticipated world output growth (which in turn depends on expected future
world real interest rates), with a coeﬃcient ωα − 1 whose sign is positive (negative)
if ση > 1 (< 1).









denote net exports in terms of domestic output, ex-
pressed as a fraction of steady state output Y . In the particular case of σ = η =1 ,i t
follows from (15) and (24) that PH,tYt = PtCt for all t, thus implying a balanced trade
10at all times. More generally, a ￿rst-order approximation yields nxt ’ yt − ct − α st
which combined with (25) and (27) implies









where Λ ≡ (2 − α)(ση − 1) + (1 − σ).
Again, in the special case of σ = η =1we have nxt =0for all t, though the latter
property will also hold for any con￿guration of parameters such that Λ =0 . As we will
see below, when that condition is satis￿ed, the objective function for the small open
economy￿s monetary authority collapses into that of the closed economy counterpart.
More generally, the sign of the relationship between the output diﬀerential and net
exports is ambiguous, depending on the sign of Λ, which is in turn increasing in both
σ and η.I f Λ > 0, a positive output diﬀerential (favorable to the small economy)
generates a trade surplus, whereas the sign of the reversed if Λ < 0. Notice, also, the
sign of Λ determines the sign of the eﬀect on net exports of a change in the terms of
trade, given that nxt = αΛ
σ st. Therefore the condition Λ > 0 is our model￿s analog
to the Marshall-Lerner conditions.
3.2 The Supply Side: Marginal Cost and In￿ation Dynamics
3.2.1 Marginal Cost and In￿ation Dynamics in the Rest of the World
Under our assumptions, the dynamics of in￿a t i o ni nt h ew o r l de c o n o m yc o r r e s p o n d
to those of a closed economy characterized by staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo.
By combining the optimal price setting equation (21) corresponding to the world
economy, with the log-linear version of the equation describing the evolution of the
aggregate price level, one can derive the diﬀerence equation:11
π
∗
t = β Et{π
∗






t + ￿ denotes the (log) real marginal cost, expressed as a deviation
from its steady state value (−￿), while the slope coeﬃcient is given by λ ≡
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ .












∗ + σ c
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∗ +( σ + ϕ) y
∗
t − (1 + ϕ) a
∗
t (32)
where ν∗ ≡− log(1 − τ∗),w i t hτ∗ denoting a constant employment subsidy whose
role is discussed below.
11The derivation of the in￿ation equation in the world economy follows that of the small open
economy found in Appendix 2 (as well as in numerous papers in the literature), with suitable change
of notation. See, e.g., Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or Sbordone (1999) for an empirical assessment of
the implied in￿ation dynamics.
113.2.2 Marginal Cost and In￿ation Dynamics in the Small Open Economy
In the small open economy, the dynamics of domestic in￿ation in terms of real mar-
ginal cost are described by an equation analogous to the (closed) world economy
counterpart. Hence,
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + λ c mct (33)
The determination of the real marginal cost as a function of domestic output in
the small open economy diﬀers somewhat from that in the closed economy, due to the
existence of a wedge between output and consumption, and between domestic and
consumer prices. We indeed have
mct = −ν + wt − at − pH,t
= −ν +( wt − pt)+( pt − pH,t) − at
= −ν + σ ct + ϕ nt + α st − at
= −ν + σ y
∗
t + ϕ yt + st − (1 + ϕ) at (34)
where ν ≡−log(1−τ), where the last equality makes use of (16). Thus, we see that
marginal cost is increasing in the terms of trade and world output. Both variables
end up in￿uencing the real wage, through the wealth eﬀect on labor supply resulting
from their impact on domestic consumption. In addition, changes in the terms of
t r a d eh a v ead i r e c te ﬀect on the product wage, for any given real wage. The in￿uence
of technology (through its direct eﬀect on labor productivity) and of domestic output
(through its eﬀe c to ne m p l o y m e n ta n d ,h e n c e ,t h er e a lw a g e )i sa n a l o g o u st ot h a t
observed in the closed economy.
Finally, using (25) to substitute for st, we can rewrite the previous expression for
the real marginal cost in terms of domestic output and productivity, as well as world
output:











t − (1 + ϕ) at (35)
Before turning our attention to the analysis of the properties of such an equilibrium
under alternative monetary policy regimes, we describe a convenient representation
of the model￿s equilibrium dynamics, in terms of the output gap and in￿ation.
3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics: A Canonical Representation
In this section we show that the linearized equilibrium dynamics for the small open
economy have a representation in terms of output gap and domestic in￿ation analo-
gous to that of its closed economy counterpart. That representation, which we refer
to as the canonical one, has provided the basis for the analysis and evaluation of
alternative policy rules in much of the recent literature. Let￿s de￿ne the output gap
e yt as the deviation of (log) output yt, from its natural level yt, where the latter is in
turn de￿ned as the equilibrium level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities
(and conditional on output in the rest of the world). Formally,
12e yt ≡ yt − yt




expository convenience we start by deriving the equilibrium dynamics for the world
economy.
3.3.1 World Equilibrium Dynamics
Under ￿exible prices, real marginal costs (and hence markups) in the world economy
will be constant over time, and given by mc∗ ≡− ￿, the level that would obtain under
￿exible prices. One can thus use (32), evaluated at the ￿exible price equilibrium, to
determine the natural level of world output:
y
∗





σ+ϕ ,a n dΓ0 ≡
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ. In addition one can derive a simple relationship




t =( σ + ϕ) e y
∗
t
The latter result, combined with (31), gives rise to the so-called New Keynesian
Phillips curve (or NKPC for short):
π
∗
t = β Et{π
∗
t+1} + κ0 e y
∗
t (37)
where κ0 ≡ λ(σ + ϕ). We can also rewrite (22) in terms of the world output gap:
e y
∗















t +ρ is the natural (or Wicksellian) expected real rate of
interest, i.e., the one that would prevail in a ￿exible price equilibrium. Notice that
(37) and (38), combined with a monetary policy rule determining the world interest
rate fully describe the equilibrium dynamics of the world in￿ation and output gap.
3.3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics for the Small Open Economy
The natural level of output in the small open economy can be found after imposing
mct = −￿ for all t and solving for domestic output in equation (35):





σ+ωαϕ , Γα ≡
ωα(1+ϕ)
σ+ϕωα > 0,a n dΘα ≡
σ(1−ωα)
σ+ϕωα .









which we can combine with (33) to derive a NKPC for the small open economy in
terms of the output gap:
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + κα e yt (40)





. Notice that for α =0the slope coeﬃcient is given by
κ0 ≡ λ(σ + ϕ) and (40) corresponds to the standard, closed economy NKPC. The
same is true for the ση =1case, for the latter condition implies that ωα =1 .
More generally, we see that the form of the Phillips equation for the open economy
corresponds to that of the closed economy, at least as far as domestic in￿ation is
concerned. The degree of openness aﬀects the dynamics of in￿ation only through its
in￿uence on the size of the slope of the Phillips curve, i.e., the size of the in￿ation
response to any given variation in the output gap. In the open economy, a change
in domestic output has an eﬀect on marginal cost through its impact on employment
(captured by ϕ), and the terms of trade (captured by σ
ωα, which is a function of the
degree of openness and the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods).
In particular, under the assumption that ση > 1, an increase in openness lowers
t h es i z eo ft h ea d j u s t m e n ti nt h et e r m so ft r a d en e c e s s a r yt oa b s o r bac h a n g ei n
domestic output (relative to world output), thus dampening the impact of the latter
on marginal cost and in￿ation.
Using (29) it is straightforward to derive a version of the new IS equation for the
open economy in terms of the output gap:
e yt = Et{e yt+1} −
ωα
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − rrt) (41)
where
rrt ≡ ρ −
σ(1 + ϕ)(1 − ρa)
σ + ϕωα
at − ϕΘα Et{∆y
∗
t+1}
is the small open economy￿s natural rate of interest.
Thus we see that the small open economy￿s equilibrium is characterized by an
IS-type equation similar to that found in the closed economy. Two diﬀerences can be
pointed out, however. First, the degree of openness in￿uences the sensitivity of the
output gap to interest rate changes. In particular, if ση > 1,a ni n c r e a s ei no p e n n e s s
raises that sensitivity. Second, openness makes the natural interest rate depend on
expected world output growth, in addition to domestic productivity.
4 Simple Monetary Policy Rules for the Small Open
Economy
In the present section we analyze the macroeconomic implications of three alternative
monetary policy regimes for the small open economy: a policy that aims at fully
14stabilizing domestic in￿ation (domestic in￿ation targeting, or DIT, for short), a policy
that stabilizes CPI in￿ation (CPI in￿ation targeting, CIT for short) and a policy that
pegs the exchange rate to the world currency (a PEG, for short). In all cases we
assume that the world monetary authority succeeds in fully stabilizing world prices
and the output gap; hence, we assume e y∗
t = π∗
t =0for all t. As discussed below that
is the policy which is optimal for the closed economy under our assumptions.
4.1 Domestic In￿ation Targeting
In this section we characterize the equilibrium processes for the diﬀerent variables of
our small open economy, under the assumption that the domestic pursue a domestic
in￿ation targeting policy (DIT), which implies:
e yt = πH,t =0
all t. This in turn implies yt = yt and rt = rrt for all t, with all the remaining
variables matching their natural level all the time.
In particular, it is evident from inspecting equation (39) that, under DIT, output
in the small open economy always increases in response to a positive technology shock
at home. The sign of the response to a rise in world output is ambiguous, however.
That response is negative if ωα > 1, which in turn requires that the expenditure-
switching eﬀect resulting from the real appreciation associated with a lower world
interest rate dominates the positive direct demand eﬀect; that phenomenon obtains
whenever ση > 1, which in turn implies ωα > 1.
Given that under DIT both domestic and world in￿ation are zero, it follows that
et = st , i.e., the nominal exchange rate moves one to one with the terms of trade.
Hence, under DIT, the nominal exchange rate inherits all the statistical properties
of the terms of trade, including its stationarity (and thus its reversion to a constant
mean).12 More speci￿cally, by combining (25) with (39) and (36) it is possible to













where the second equality holds up to a constant term. Hence we see that the nominal
exchange rate varies with the productivity diﬀerential, depreciating (appreciating) in
response to a relative increase in domestic (world) productivity.
Of course, stationarity does not necessarily imply low volatility. The latter will be
a function of the relative variances of domestic and world productivity, as well as the
correlation between the two. More precisely, the variance of the nominal exchange
rate under ￿exible prices will be proportional to
(σa − σa∗)
2 +2σaσa∗ (1 − ρa,a∗) (44)
12The stationarity of the terms of trade is, in turn, an implication of the stationarity of the
productivity diﬀerential coupled with our assumption of complete asset markets.
15where σa and σa∗ denote the standard deviation of domestic and world productivity,
and ρa,a∗ their correlation. Hence, we see that the required volatility of the nominal
exchange rate under DIT is increasing with the extent of the asymmetry between the
two shocks, both in terms of their magnitude (represented by the ￿rst term) and their
comovement (measured by the second term).
In addition we can also derive the implied equilibrium process for the CPI level.
Given the constancy of domestic and world prices it is given by:







where the second equality follows from (42). Thus, we see that under domestic
in￿ation targeting the CPI level will vary with the productivity diﬀerential, and will
inherit its statistical properties. The same is true for the real exchange rate, which
under the present regime will be given by qt =( 1− α) et.
4.2 CPI In￿ation Targeting
Under the regime analyzed here the monetary authority of the small economy seeks
to stabilize CPI in￿ation (as opposed to domestic in￿ation). Formally, such a policy
requires
πt =0
for all t. Under the assumption that the world economy pursues an optimal policy
(implying that the foreign price level is constant), and setting pt = p∗
t =0for all t
(without loss of generality), we can write:
pH,t = −α st (45)
thus implying common dynamics for the domestic price level and the terms of trade.
Using the previous expression to substitute for st in (25), and plugging the resulting









pH,t − (1 + ϕ)( at − a
∗
t) (46)
By substituting the latter equality in (25), plugging the resulting equation into
(35) and combining with the in￿ation equation (33) one can derive the following
stochastic second order diﬀerence equation describing the equilibrium behavior of the
domestic price level:
γc pH,t = pH,t−1 + β Et{pH,t+1} − λ(1 + ϕ)( at − a
∗
t) (47)







. Under the simplifying assumption that ρa = ρ∗
a this
equation has a unique stationary representation given by
16pH,t = ξc pH,t−1 − ζc (at − a
∗
t) (48)








∈ (0,1),a n dζc ≡
λξc(1+ϕ)
(1−ξcβρa) > 0.
Notice that under CIT the sign of the response of domestic prices to a change
in relative productivity is unambiguously negative. The reason is simple: a rise in
domestic productivity leads to a real depreciation of the terms of trade and, given
domestic prices,t oa ni n c r e a s ei nC P Ii n ￿ation (see (11)). The desired stabilization
of CPI in￿ation is therefore achieved by inducing a decline in domestic prices and
a smaller real depreciation, both of which can be attained by means of a negative
output gap.
By combining (47) and (45) it is then possible to derive the equilibrium processes
for the terms of trade and in turn for the nominal and real exchange rates (notice
that under CIT we have qt = et all t , i.e., nominal and real exchange rate coincide).
In particular we will have




Thus, under CIT, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate must be stationary and,
given the evolution of the domestic price level, it must depreciate in response to a rise
in productivity. Furthermore, and in contrast with the DIT regime, the exchange rate
(nominal and real) will display some endogenous persistence, beyond that inherited
from the productivity diﬀerential.
4.3 An Exchange Rate Peg
The third monetary arrangement for the small open economy consists of a permanent
(and credible) exchange rate peg vis a vis the rest of the world. In the context of our
model, this is equivalent to the adoption of the world currency by the small economy,
with the corresponding relinquishment of an autonomous monetary policy. Again, for
simplicity, we maintain the assumption of an optimal monetary policy for the world
economy. That policy is based on world aggregates, and is not aﬀected by the joining
of the world monetary union by our small economy, given the negligible size of the
latter.
In the absence of capital controls, an implication of monetary integration is the
equalization of the domestic interest rate to the world interest rate. Furthermore,
constancy of the nominal exchange rate and world prices implies that st = −pH,t and
qt = −pt,f o ra l lt.
Employing a similar strategy to the one followed in the case of CPI targeting
above, we can derive a second order diﬀerence equation for the domestic price level:
γe pH,t = pH,t−1 + β Et{pH,t+1} − λ(1 + ϕ)( at − a
∗
t) (50)






. The unique stationary representation for pH,t in this
case is given by:
pH,t = ξe pH,t−1 − ζe (at − a
∗
t)








∈ (0,1),a n dζe ≡
λξe(1+ϕ)
(1−ξeβρa) > 0.
The stationarity of the domestic price level is again a direct implication of the
stationarity of the terms of trade, given the constancy of the nominal exchange rate
and the world price level. Notice that the sign and qualitative pattern of the response
of domestic prices under a peg is identical to the one derived for a CIT regime.
In particular, it displays some endogenous persistence beyond that inherited from
variations in the productivity diﬀerential. The diﬀerence between the two responses
is easy to characterize: notice that γe < γc, which in turn implies ξe > ξc and
ζe > ζc . Accordingly, an exchange rate peg leads to a stronger and more persistent
adjustment of domestic prices (and, hence, of the output gap) in response to a shock
in the productivity diﬀerential, relative to a CPI targeting regime.
Furthermore, and given et = p∗
t =0for all t, it follows that the CPI level is
proportional to the domestic price level:
pt =( 1− α) pH,t
and, hence, it shares its statistical properties and response patterns. In particular,
and in contrast with a DIT regime, the CPI must fall under a peg in response to a
rise in the productivity diﬀerential.
Let us point out, as a general remark, that there is an interesting similarity across
the alternative regimes considered here: they all imply a stationary price level and
nominal exchange rate. That feature is in stark contrast with the non-stationarity of
both variables observed in the data. That contrast may suggest that neither regime
provides a good approximation to the policies pursued by actual economies. On the
other hand, it is worth noticing that both the DIT and CIT regimes can be considered
as limiting cases of simple linear Taylor-type rules of the form rt = ρ + φπ πH,t (for
DIT) and rt = ρ + φπ πt (for CIT), when φπ →∞ . Under such ￿￿exible￿ in￿ation
targeting regimes, the implied equilibrium dynamics would result in non-stationary
price level and nominal exchange rate.13 By way of contrast, the stationarity of
the price level under an exchange rate peg would also carry over to a more ￿exible,
managed system in which the nominal exchange rate was allowed to ￿uctuate around
a constant central parity. In that case, the stationarity of the terms of trade (a
consequence of our assumptions of complete asset markets) and the stability of world
prices would guarantee that both domestic and consumer prices remained stationary.
4.4 Dynamic Eﬀects of a Domestic Productivity Shock
In this section we present some quantitative results based on a calibrated version of
our model economy. Let￿s ￿rst state the main assumptions underlying our baseline
calibration, which we take as a benchmark. We set σ equal to unity, which corresponds
to a log utility speci￿cation, and η equal to 1.W ea s s u m eϕ =3 , which implies a labor
supply elasticity of 1
3, and a value for the steady-state markup ￿ =1 .2, which implies
that ε, the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods, is 6.P a r a m e t e r
13These results are, for the sake of brevity of exposition, not displayed here but are available upon
request from the authors.
18θ is set equal to 0.75, a value consistent with an average period of one year between
price adjustments. We assume β =0 .99, which implies a riskless annual return of
about 4 percent in the steady state. We set ρa =0 .9 a n dt h e nc a l i b r a t eσ2
a so that the
standard deviation of the natural level of output in the (closed) world economy is 2
percent, which we take as a (reasonable) benchmark. All the previous parameters are
assumed to take identical values in the small open economy and the world economy.
In addition, the small economy is characterized by an openness index α for which we
assume a value of 0.4; the latter corresponds roughly to the share of imports in GDP
for Canada. Furthermore, the correlation between the domestic and world shocks is
set to 0.77, a value that we estimate using quarterly productivity data for Canada
and the U.S.
We start by describing the dynamic eﬀects of a domestic productivity shock on
a number of macroeconomic variables. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses to a
unit innovation in at under the three regimes considered. By construction, domestic
in￿ation and the output gap remain unchanged under DIT (solid line), whereas they
both fall under CIT (dashed) and the peg (short dashes). We also see that the
shock leads to a persistent reduction in the domestic interest rate as it is needed
in order to support the transitory expansion in consumption and output consistent
with the ￿exible price allocation. Given the constancy of the world nominal interest
rate the uncovered interest parity implies an initial nominal depreciation followed
by expectations of a future appreciation, as re￿ected in the response of the nominal
exchange rate. Relative to the other regimes, the constancy of domestic prices under
DIT then accounts for a larger real depreciation and therefore for a further expansion
in demand and output through a rise in net exports (not shown here). Notice also
that CPI in￿ation rises at ￿rst (with this rise being proportional to the degree of
openness), but becomes negative ever after, in accordance with the exchange rate
response.
It is interesting to contrast the implied dynamic behavior of several macro vari-
ables under CIT (dashed line) with the one under DIT. Notice, in particular, that
stabilization of CPI in￿ation leads to a deviation from DIT on two margins: a decline
in domestic prices and a more muted depreciation of both the nominal and the real
exchange rate, both on impact and along the transition. That, in turn, requires a
more contractionary policy (a higher interest rate), which is re￿ected in a higher
nominal (and real) interest rate. Under our calibration this implies an overshooting
in the interest rate, which rises at ￿rst and then falls over time.14 As shown above,
this policy arrangement is consistent with stationarity of both the price level and the
exchange rate. Yet both output gap and in￿ation fall sharply under CIT relative to
DIT, so that their implied volatility largely exceeds the one under DIT. As discussed
below, and under some special assumptions, that higher volatility is unambiguously
associated with a welfare loss, relative to DIT.15
14Notice that this initial rise of the nominal intrest rate (for a given world interest rate), followed
by a subsequent fall, is still consistent with the observed depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
on impact. It is, in fact, the behavior of current and expected future interest rate diﬀerentials
that matters for the current nominal exchange rate, as can be easily seen by solving the uncovered
interest parity condition forward.
15We develop our results on welfare later. Notice, however, that the cost of dampening exchange
19Finally the same ￿gure displays the corresponding impulse responses under an
exchange rate peg. Notice that the responses of output gap and in￿ation are quali-
tatively similar to the CIT case. However, the impossibility of lowering the nominal
rate and letting the currency depreciate, as would be needed in order to support the
expansion in consumption and output required in order to replicate the ￿exible price
allocation, determines an ampli￿cation of the same responses and therefore further
volatility in in￿ation and output gap. Again the stationarity of the price level im-
plied by the peg requires that the initial, short-lived de￿ation is eventually followed
by a period of persistent (albeit low) in￿ation. That pattern, combined with the con-
stancy of the nominal rate, implies a decline in expected long real rates (not shown
in the ￿gure), with the consequent expansion in consumption and a real depreciation.
However the real depreciation is in this case much more muted on impact (though
more persistent), given that it can be achieved only through an adjustment in relative
prices.
In order to complement our quantitative analysis, Table 1 reports the standard
deviation of several key variables under alternative monetary policy regimes. For each
case we display statistics for three scenarios: domestic shocks only, foreign shocks only,
and both foreign and domestic shocks. The numbers con￿rm some of the ￿ndings that
were already evident from visual inspection of the impulse responses. Hence, we see
that a DIT regime requires substantially more volatility in the nominal exchange rate
than a CIT regime, independently of the source of shocks. The PEG regime ampli￿es
both output gap and in￿ation volatility relative to DIT, with the CIT regime lying
somewhere in between. Notice also that in the scenario with both shocks the implied
volatility of the real and nominal exchange rate is substantially lower than the one
of output and, hence, far lower than the relative volatility observed in the data.16
Furthermore the real exchange rate is more stable under an exchange rate peg than
under any other policy regime. That ￿nding, which is consistent with the evidence of
Mussa (1986), points to the existence of ￿excess smoothness￿ in real exchange rates
under ￿xed exchange rates. That feature is a consequence of the inability of prices
(which are sticky) to compensate for the constancy of the nominal exchange rate.17
4.4.1 Monetary regimes and Macroeconomic Volatility: Sensitivity Analy-
sis
To conclude our quantitative section we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the second
moments of selected variables to the calibration of three key parameters. Figures 2,
3 and 4 display the eﬀect on the volatility of output gap, in￿ation, nominal and real
exchange rates of varying, respectively, the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods η, the degree of openness α, and the index of price stickiness θ.I n
rate volatility (and therefore the relative ranking between DIT and CIT ) may be a function of the
lags with which exchange rate movements aﬀect prices, i.e., of the degree of pass-through. Intuitively,
the lower the degree of pass-through, the smaller (ceteris paribus) the cost of short-run relative
price inertia, and therefore the more desirable to pursue a policy of CIT relative to DIT.
16The standard deviation of the real exchange rate relative to that of output reported in Backus
et al. (1985) is 1.91 for the U.S., 2.0 for Canada, 1.76 for Germany, and 1.95 for the U.K..
17See Monacelli (1999) for a detailed analysis of the implications of ￿xed exchange rates.
20each panel we maintain our benchmark calibration σ = η =1(with the exception
of Figure 2 where η can vary) and compare the implied volatility under the three
monetary regimes analyzed so far.
Several interesting observations are in order. To begin with, notice that in all
cases the ranking between rules is robust to the choice of parameter values. A clear
trade-oﬀ emerges between the stabilization of both the nominal and real exchange
rates, on the one hand, and the stabilization of in￿ation and the output gap on the
other. Thus, the DIT regime achieves full stabilization of output gap and in￿ation,
but at the cost of boosting the instability of the exchange rates. The converse is true
for the exchange rate peg, with CIT emerging as a hybrid regime.
In particular, notice (see Figure 2) that an increase in the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods lowers the volatility of both the nominal and the
real exchange rate. In the limit, as η becomes arbitrarily large (i.e., as goods become
perfectly substitutable), that volatility approaches zero, since the size of the necessary
relative price adjustments in response to shocks is dampened.
Consider next the eﬀect of increasing the degree of openness α, as displayed in
Figure 3. Notice ￿rst that under our benchmark calibration both DIT and PEG
regimes imply that output gap and in￿ation volatility are independent of openness,
so that in both these cases the equilibrium dynamics is isomorphic to the one of a
closed economy. This can be easily seen by recalling that pH,t =0under DIT and
by inspecting equation (50) for the case of a PEG, which is independent of α when
σ = η =1 . Yet the same is not true for the CIT regime, which corresponds to DIT
for α =0and converges to a PEG when α → 1. As it is clear from equation (47),
the dynamics of the domestic price level depend on α, even in the special case of
σ = η =1 . In fact, when α → 1, and given our assumption of complete international
asset markets, the consumption basket in the small economy corresponds to that of
the world economy, with the law of one price implying a constant real exchange rate
(and therefore aggregate PPP). Given the fact that qt = et − pt, i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that CIT and the PEG must be equivalent.
Interestingly, and unlike the conventional wisdom on the eﬀects of exchange rate
instability on trade, a higher degree of openness (i.e., trade intensity) has a negative
eﬀect on the volatility of the real exchange rate.18Under risk sharing, in fact, and
for given ￿uctuations in relative consumption baskets, a larger degree of openness
requires smaller ￿uctuations in real relative prices.
Finally, we look at the eﬀect of varying the degree of price stickiness (i.e., the
probability of not resetting prices θ). Figure 4 reports the corresponding volatility
measures. As we approach full rigidity of prices (i.e., θ → 1)i n ￿ation volatility is
reduced, but at the cost of boosting output gap volatility. In this case, in fact, full
price rigidity is imposed as a constraint, and ￿rms are prevented from adjusting prices
even if they wished to do so. This implies large ￿uctuations in markups and therefore
in the output gap. Notice also that, under DIT, the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate is independent of θ, as implied by equation (42). An analogous invariance holds
for the real exchange rate (or any other variable). Intuitively, the constraints on price
adjustment are not binding under that regime, since all ￿rms manage to maintain
18See Hau (2000) for an empirical assessment of this point, in the context of a diﬀerent model.
21their desired markup at all times, at unchanged prices. Equilibrium allocations and
relative prices are thus independent of the degree of price stickiness.
On the other hand, under the CIT regime, as θ approaches 1, the volatility of
both the nominal and real exchange rates approaches zero as the rigidity of prices
increases, as implied by equation (49). The same is true for the real exchange rate
under a PEG.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section we derive and discuss the properties of the equilibrium dynamics
when both the domestic and world monetary authorities pursue an optimal monetary
policy. Our analysis is restricted to a special case￿which corresponds to the baseline
calibration considered above￿for which a second order approximation to the welfare
of the representative consumer can be easily derived.
We start by recalling the form of the welfare-based objective function in the closed
economy, which is the one relevant to the world economy in our case. Then we proceed
with the corresponding analysis for the small open economy, trying to identify the
issues that are speci￿ct oi t .
5.1 Optimal Monetary Policy in the World Economy
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) we assume that the ￿scal authority in
the (closed) world economy fully neutralizes the distortions associated with ￿rms￿
market power by means of a constant employment subsidy τ∗. Under that assumption
it is easy to show that the ￿exible price equilibrium allocation is optimal in the
(closed) world economy. To see this, notice that the optimal allocation must maximize
U(C∗
t )−V (N∗
t ) subject to C∗
t = A∗
tN∗
t , for all t, where the constraint already imposes
an even allocation of resources across ￿rms (a necessary condition for eﬃciency, and
which is satis￿ed in the ￿exible price allocation since all ￿rms will be setting the same





















Hence, by setting τ∗ = 1
ε (or, equivalently, ν∗ = ￿) the world policymaker guar-
antees the optimality of the ￿exible price equilibrium allocation. It follows that the
optimal monetary policy in such an environment is the one that succeeds in closing
the output gap and fully stabilizing prices, i.e. e y∗
t = π∗
t =0at t =0 .
Notice that the equilibrium level of world output associated with that optimal
policy corresponds to its natural level, as derived in (36). Given (38), we can easily












5.2 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Small Open Economy:
AS p e c i a lC a s e
As noted by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a), among others, in an open economy there is
a second factor that distorts the incentives of the monetary authority (in addition to
market power): the possibility of in￿uencing the terms of trade in a way bene￿cial to
domestic consumers. This possibility is a consequence of the imperfect substitutabil-
ity between domestic and foreign goods, combined with sticky prices (which render
monetary policy non-neutral).20 Below we assume the presence of an employment
subsidy that exactly oﬀsets the combined eﬀects of market power and the terms of
trade distortions in the steady state. That assumption rules out the existence of an
average in￿ation (or de￿ation) bias, and allows us to focus on the policies consistent
w i t haz e r oa v e r a g ei n ￿ation, in a way analogous to the world economy.
Let us ￿rst characterize the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of a social
planner facing the resource constraints that the small open economy is subject to in
equilibrium (vis a vis the rest of the world), and given our assumption of complete
markets. In that case, that optimal allocation must maximize U(Ct)−V (Nt) subject
to the technological constraint Yt = AtNt and the consumption/output possibilities
set Ct = f(Yt,Y∗
t ) (with the latter embedding the risk sharing condition (15), as well
as the equilibrium relationship between the terms of trade, and domestic and foreign
output implicit in (24)).
The derivation of a tractable, analytical solution requires that we restrict ourselves
to the special case of σ = η =1 . In that case, and as shown above, we have the exact
expression Ct = Y
1−α
t (ϑY ∗
t )α. The optimal allocation (from the viewpoint of the
small open economy, which takes world output as given) must satisfy,
V
0(Nt)Nt =( 1− α)U
0(Ct)Ct
which, under the assumed preferences, implies a constant employment N =( 1 −α)
1
1+ϕ.






19In order for equation (51) to be interpretable as an optimal rule, one could add an extra term
(e.g., ϕππ∗
t with ϕπ > 1). In that case we would eliminate the indeterminacy that would otherwise
be associated with an interest rate that depends on exogenous variables only. Notice however that
such a term will be zero in equilibrium. See, e.g., Woodford (2000), for a detailed discussion.
20This distinguishes our analysis from Goodfriend and King (2001) who assume that the price of












=( 1 − τ) N
1+ϕ
t
Hence, by setting τ such that (1 −τ)(1−α)=1− 1
ε is satis￿ed (or, equivalently,
ν = ￿+log(1−α)) the small open economy￿s policy maker guarantees the optimality
of the ￿exible price equilibrium allocation. As in the closed economy case, the optimal
monetary policy requires stabilizing the output gap (i.e., e yt =0 ,f o ra l lt). Equation
(40) then implies that domestic prices are also stabilized under that optimal policy
(πH,t =0for all t). Thus, in the special case under consideration, domestic in￿ation
targeting is indeed the optimal policy.
5.2.1 The Welfare Costs of Alternative Simple Rules
As we show in Appendix 3, and for the special case considered in the present section,
a second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer in the

















+ t.i.p. + o(kak
3) (52)
Taking unconditional expectations on (52) and letting β → 1, the expected welfare
losses of any policy that deviated from strict in￿ation targeting can be written in






var(πH,t)+( 1+ϕ) var(e yt)
i
. (53)
Table 2 reports the welfare losses associated with the two simple rules analyzed in
the previous section: CPI targeting and an exchange rate peg. In both cases we report
welfare numbers for the usual three scenarios: domestic shocks only, foreign shocks
only and both shocks. There are four panels in this table. The top panel reports
welfare losses in the case of our benchmark parameterization, while the remaining
three panels display the eﬀects of lowering, respectively, the steady-state markup,
the elasticity of labor supply and both. All entries are to be read as percentage units
of steady state consumption, and in deviation from the ￿r s tb e s tr e p r e s e n t e db yD I T .
Under our baseline calibration both rules are suboptimal since they involve non-
trivial deviations from domestic price stability. As it stands clear, the exchange rate
peg implies in all scenarios a substantially larger deviation from the ￿r s tb e s tr e l a t i v e
to CIT, as already arguable from the quantitative evaluation of the second moments
conducted above. However, and as is usually the case in welfare exercises of this sort
found in the literature, the implied welfare losses are quantitatively small for both
policy regimes. This is particularly true in the two-shock scenario, which implies a
lower volatility of both the nominal and real exchange rate relative to the scenarios
with one shock only.
24Consider next the eﬀect of lowering, respectively, the steady-state markup to 1.1,
by setting ε =1 1(which implies a larger penalization of in￿ation variability in the loss
function) and the elasticity of labor supply to 0.1 (which implies a larger penalization
of output gap variability). Although the relative ranking between CIT and PEG is
unaltered, the eﬀect is a substantial magni￿cation of welfare losses relative to the
benchmark case, especially in the third exercise where both parameters are lowered
simultaneously. However, as a percentage of steady state consumption, the losses
continue to remain quantitatively small.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: the Role of Openness and of Co-
movement with World Shocks
In this section we investigate to what extent the welfare-based ranking of the monetary
policy regimes discussed above may be sensitive to the calibration of two central
parameters characterizing the small open economy: the degree of openness and the
correlation between domestic and world shocks.
Figure 5 displays how our welfare measure associated with alternative policies
varies with α, the openness index. Notice, ￿rst, that the relative ranking among
monetary policy regimes is invariant to the degree of openness. In particular, for all
α ∈ (0,1), both CIT and the exchange rate peg imply substantially larger welfare
losses relative to DIT, with the former always dominating the latter.
In the limiting case of α =0 , the domestic economy becomes closed and DIT
coincides with CIT. As a result, their associated welfare measures also coincide. Only
the exchange rate peg implies a larger welfare loss in that limiting case.
When α → 1, and given our assumption of complete international asset markets,
the consumption basket in the small economy corresponds to that of the world econ-
omy, with the risk sharing condition implying a constant real exchange rate and a
perfect correlation between domestic and world consumption. In that context there
are no possible welfare gains (or losses) associated with deviations from a DIT policy,
as implied by the welfare function (52). Therefore both CIT and the PEG converge
to DIT as a limiting case, and under this scenario all rules replicate the eﬃcient
allocation.
Notice also that CIT dominates the exchange rate peg for any α value (other
t h a n1 ) .I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t ep e gi st h eo n l yr e g i m ef o rw h i c hw e l f a r ei s
monotonically increasing in openness. Under that regime, the lower is α, the larger is
the variation in domestic prices required to bring about any relative price adjustment.
Therefore the key intuition to be applied to the analysis of all the rules above is
that, as long as aggregate PPP does not hold (which is the case for values of α < 1),
a lower degree of openness makes limiting exchange rate ￿exibility more costly by
boosting the volatility of in￿ation and output gap.
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀect on welfare of varying the cross-country
correlation of shocks under alternative monetary regimes. Notice that, for all the
rules considered, the deviation from DIT converges to zero as the shock correlation
approaches unity. For both CIT policies and the exchange rate peg the cost of limiting
the ￿exibility of relative prices is inversely related to the correlation of shocks. In the
25limit, as the correlation with world shocks becomes perfect, the cost of mimicking the
interest rate decision made by the (optimizing) world monetary authority vanishes.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed and analyzed a model of a small open economy with
staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo. We have shown that the equilibrium dynamics for
the small open economy model have a canonical representation (in terms of domestic
in￿ation and the output gap) analogous to that of its closed economy counterpart.
More precisely, their representations diﬀer only in two respects: (a) some coeﬃcients
of the equilibrium dynamical system for the small open economy depend on parame-
ters that are speci￿c to the latter (the degree of openness and the substitutability
between domestic and foreign goods), and (b) the natural levels of output and in-
terest rates in the small open economy are a function of both domestic and foreign
disturbances. In particular, the closed economy is nested in the small open economy
model, as a limiting case.
We have then used our framework to analyze the properties of three alternative
monetary regimes for the small open economy: (a) domestic in￿ation targeting, (b)
CPI in￿ation targeting, and (c) an exchange rate peg. Our analysis point to a clear
tradeoﬀ between the stabilization of both the nominal and real exchange rates, on the
one hand, and the stabilization of in￿ation and the output gap on the other. Hence
a policy of domestic in￿ation targeting, which achieves a simultaneous stabilization
of both domestic prices and the output gap, entails a substantially larger volatility
of nominal and real exchange rates relative to a policy of CPI targeting and/or an
exchange rate peg. The converse is true for the latter regime. In general a regime
of CPI targeting delivers equilibrium dynamics that allow us to characterize it as
a hybrid regime, somewhere between domestic in￿ation targeting and a peg. In
particular, CPI targeting coincides with domestic in￿ation targeting in the limiting
case of a closed economy, while it mimics the dynamics under a peg when domestic
and foreign consumption baskets are identical (which happens when the degree of
openness reaches its highest limit).
We have also shown that, under a speci￿c parameterization, a tractable second
order approximation to the utility of the small open economy￿s consumer can be
derived, and the welfare level implied by alternative monetary policy rules can be
evaluated. In that case, the implied loss function is analogous to the one applying
to the corresponding closed economy, which penalizes ￿uctuations in domestic in￿a-
tion and the output gap. In particular, under our assumptions, domestic in￿ation
targeting emerges as the optimal policy regime. Relative to the latter, CPI in￿ation
targeting and an exchange rate peg deliver higher welfare losses, due to the excess
smoothness of real exchange rates that they involve. Quantitatively, however, the
welfare losses involved are small.
Our framework lends itself to several extensions. First, it is important to em-
phasize that domestic price stability (along with fully ￿exible exchange rates) stands
out as the welfare maximizing policy in the particular case of log-utility and unitary
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods that we analyze here.
26The derivation of a more general welfare function for the small open economy would
allow a more thorough analysis and quantitative evaluation of the optimal monetary
policy and should certainly be the object of future research.
Second, a two-country version of the framework developed here would allow us
to analyze a number of issues that cannot be addressed with the present model,
including the importance of spillover eﬀects in the design of optimal monetary policy,
the potential bene￿ts from monetary policy coordination, and the implications of
exchange rate stabilization agreements. Recent work by Benigno and Benigno (2001),
Clarida et al. (2001), and Pappa (2001) has already made some inroads on that front.
Our current work in progress seeks to recast that analysis in terms of the simple
canonical model representation developed in the present paper.
A further interesting extension would involve the introduction, along with sticky
prices, of sticky nominal wages in the small open economy. As pointed out by Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000), the simultaneous presence of both forms of nominal
rigidity introduces an additional tradeoﬀ that renders strict price in￿ation targeting
policies suboptimal. It may be interesting to analyze how that tradeoﬀ would aﬀect
the ranking across monetary policy regimes of the present paper.
Finally, it is worth noticing that our analysis features complete exchange rate
pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to prices of imported (or exported)
goods. Some of the implications of less than complete pass-through associated with
local currency pricing by exporters and importers have already been analyzed by
several authors in the context of two-country models with one-period, price-setting
in advance (see, e.g., Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2001), Devereux and Engle (2000),
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b)). It would be interesting to explore some of those
implications (e.g., for the nature of the optimal monetary policy problem and the
relative performance of alternative policy regimes) in the context of the simple small
open economy with staggered price-setting proposed here.
27Appendix 1: The Steady State
Next we characterize the perfect foresight, zero in￿ation steady state of our small
open economy model, taking Y ∗ as given and setting At ≡ 1, for all t.W e u s e
variables without time subscripts to refer to steady state values. Markups are constant
in the steady state at the level ε
ε−1, implying
(1−τ) W
PH =( 1− 1
ε). The latter fact,
combined with (7) and the identity P
PH =[ ( 1 − α)+α S1−η]
1





In steady state, the risk sharing condition (15) takes the form Cσ =( ϑY ∗)σ q(S)
where q(S) ≡ S
g(S) links the real exchange rate and the terms of trade in the steady
state. One can easily check that g0(S) > 0 and q0(S) > 0. Combining the previous










Notice that Hs < 0,w i t hlims→0 H(S,Y∗)=+ ∞and lims→∞ H(S,Y∗)=0 .
On the other hand, market clearing requires
Y = CH,t + C
∗
H,t
=( 1 − α) g(S)




The latter expression can be combined with (15) to yield:









Notice that function J satis￿es Js > 0,a n dlims→0 J(S,Y∗)=0and lims→∞ J(S,Y∗)=
+∞.H e n c e ,g i v e nav a l u ef o rY ∗ and ϑ, (54) and (55) jointly (and uniquely) deter-
mine the steady state values for S and q(S), i.e., the steady state terms of trade and
the real exchange rate.
For convenience, and without loss of generality, we can assume that initial con-
ditions (i.e., initial distribution of wealth) are such that αϑ
α∗ =1 . In that case, (55)
implies that S = q(S)=1 ,a n dC = Y = ϑY ∗ . The latter condition implies zero net
exports (i.e., balanced trade) in the new steady state.
O n ec a nv i e wt h es m a l lo p e ne c o n o m ys e t u pu s e di nt h ep r e s e n tp a p e ra sc o r r e -
sponding to the limiting case of α∗ → 0 and ϑ → 0 , though with a well de￿ned ratio
α∗
ϑ = α ∈ (0,1).
28Appendix 2: Optimal Price Setting in the Calvo
Model
Following Calvo (1983) we assume that each individual ￿rm resets its price with
probability 1 − θ each period, independently of the time elapsed since the last ad-
justment. Thus, each period a measure 1 − θ of (randomly selected) ￿rms reset
their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. Let P H,t(j)denote the
price set by a ￿rm j adjusting its price in period t. Under the Calvo price-setting
structure, PH,t+k(j)=PH,t(j) with probability θ
k for k =0 ,1,2,....Since all ￿rms
resetting prices in any given period will choose the same price, we henceforth drop
the j subscript.
When setting a new price in period t ￿rm j seeks to maximize the current value


























At denotes the nominal marginal cost.














Using the fact that Qt,t+k = β












































PH,t−1,a n dMCt+k =
MCn
t+k
PH,t+k . Log-linearizing the previous condition
around the perfect foresight, zero in￿ation steady state with balanced trade we obtain:









where c mct ≡ mct − mc is the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady
state value mc = −log ε
ε−1 ≡− ￿.
29Notice, that we can rewrite the previous expression in more compact form as:
pH,t − pH,t−1 = βθ Et{pH,t+1 − pH,t} + πH,t +( 1− βθ) c mct (57)
Alternatively, using the relationship c mct = mcn
t −pH,t+￿ to substitute for c mct in
(57), and after some straightforward algebra, we obtain a version of the price-setting
rule in terms of expected nominal marginal costs:







which corresponds to expression (21) in the text.
Under the assumed price-setting structure, the dynamics of the domestic price




1−ε +( 1− θ)( PH,t)
1−ε⁄ 1
1−ε (58)
which can be log-linearized around the zero in￿ation steady state to yield,
πH,t =( 1− θ)( pH,t − pH,t−1)
Finally, we can combine the previous expression with (57) above to yield, after
some algebra,
πH,t = β Et{πH,t+1} + λ c mct
where λ ≡
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ , and which corresponds to (33) in the text.
The in￿ation equation for the world economy can be derived in an analogous
manner.
30Appendix 3: Derivation of the Welfare Loss Func-
tion for the Special Case
In the present appendix we derive a second order approximation of representa-
tive consumer￿s utility about the ￿exible price equilibrium allocation. function. As
discussed in the main text, we eventually restrict our analysis to the special case
of σ = η =1 . For expository purposes we start with the general case. Below we
make frequent use of the following second order approximation of percent deviations











n) represents terms that are of order higher than nth, in the bound kak
on the amplitude of the relevant shocks.
The approximation of U(Ct)=l o gCt about the ￿exible price equilibrium yields:
U(Ct)=ct + e ct + o(kak
3)
= ct +( 1− α) e yt + o(kak
3)
where o(kak
3) refers to terms of third or higher order. Notice that in deriving the
second equality we have made use of (28) and the fact that y∗
t is taken as exogenous
by the monetary authority.
Similarly, and letting V t ≡ V (Nt),w eh a v e













The next step consists in rewriting the previous expression in terms of the output










di ,w eh a v e
e nt = e yt + ut







di. The following lemma shows that ut is proportional
to the cross-sectional distribution of relative prices (and, hence, of second order).
Lemma 1: ut = ε
2 vari{pH,t(i)} + o(kak
3).





=e x p [ ( 1 − ε) b pH,t(i)]




















































from which follows that ut = ε
2 vari{pH,t(i)} + o(kak
3).
We can thus rewrite the second order approximation to the disutility of labor as:




e yt + ut +
1
2






Under the optimal subsidy scheme assumed, the optimality condition V
0
t Nt =
(1 − α) holds for all t, allowing us to rewrite the period utility as:









+ t.i.p. + o(kak
3)









H,t,w h e r eλ ≡
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
Proof: Woodford (2001, NBER WP8071), pp 22-23.
Collecting all the previous results, we can write the second order approximation
















+ t.i.p. + o(kak
3)
which is equation (52) in the text.
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35Table 1
      Macroeconomic Volatility under Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes
                                                                    (standard deviation in %)
                        DIT                       CIT PEG
                      shocks domestic foreign both domestic foreign both domestic foreign both
Output Gap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.425 0.425 0.286 0.635 0.635 0.428
Domestic Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.210 0.210 0.142 0.397 0.397 0.267
Output  2.007 0.000 2.007 1.791 0.425 1.971 1.647 0.635 1.955
CPI Inflation 0.359 0.359 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.238 0.160
Nominal I. Rate 0.201 0.000 0.201 0.124 0.215 0.212 0.000 0.201 0.201
Real Ex. Rate 1.204 1.204 0.812 1.074 1.074 0.724 0.988 0.988 0.666
Nominal Ex. Rate 2.007 2.007 1.353 1.074 1.074 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.000                  Table 2
               Contribution to Welfare Loss
l l=1.2, w w=3                  benchmark
                        DIT CIT PEG
                      shocks domestic foreign both domestic foreign both
Var(Domestic Inflation) -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.033 -0.033 -0.015
Var(Output Gap) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Total -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.038 -0.038 -0.017
l l=1.1, w w=3                                      low steady-state markup
                        DIT CIT PEG
                      shocks domestic foreign both domestic foreign both
Var(Domestic Inflation) -0.017 -0.017 -0.008 -0.061 -0.061 -0.027
Var(Output Gap) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Total -0.019 -0.019 -0.009 -0.065 -0.065 -0.030
l l=1.2, w w=10                                          low elasticity of labor supply
                        DIT CIT PEG
                      shocks domestic foreign both domestic foreign both
Var(Domestic Inflation) -0.015 -0.015 -0.007 -0.061 -0.061 -0.028
Var(Output Gap) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Total -0.017 -0.017 -0.008 -0.067 -0.067 -0.030
l l=1.1, w w=10                                                                low markup and elasticity of labor supply
                        DIT CIT PEG
                      shocks domestic foreign both domestic foreign both
Var(Domestic Inflation) -0.027 -0.027 -0.012 -0.112 -0.112 -0.051
Var(Output Gap) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Total -0.029 -0.029 -0.013 -0.118 -0.118 -0.053
Note: entries are percentage units of steady-state consumption